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Abstract
The sensitivity to risk that most people (hence, financial operators) feel
affects the dynamics of financial transactions. Here we present an approach to
this problem based on a current generalization of Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical
mechanics.
An important question in the theory of financial decisions is how to take into account
those psychological attitudes of human beings that produce significant deviations from the
ideally rational behavior. It is not by chance that a new discipline that focus on such ques-
tions, behavioral finance, is starting to gain universal recognition. In fact, Daniel Kanheman
from the Psychology Department at Princeton University has been awarded (together with
Vernon Smith) the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics “for having integrated insights from
psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and
decision-making under uncertainty” [1].
Indeed, one of the human attitudes with important consequences in financial decision
making is the risk aversion (attraction) that most people feel when they expect to gain
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(lose). This sensitivity to risk is also observed in animals such as rats, birds and honeybees
[2] when they are exposed to variable food sources with different statistical properties, such
as mean or variance, of the offered quantity of food.
The usual preference for a sure choice over an alternative of equally or even more favorable
expected value is called risk aversion. Actually, most people present the tendency to feel
aversion to risk when they expect to gain with moderate or high probability, and attraction
to risk when they expect to lose. However, these tendencies are inverted for very low
probabilities [3].
Naturally, this pattern of attitudes affects most human decisions since chance factors
are always present, e.g., in medical strategies, in gambling or in financial transactions. In
particular, in the context of finances, the attitude of economic operators under risky choices
clearly is one of the main ingredients to be kept in mind for realistically modeling market
dynamics.
In the present text, we want to discuss the sensitivity to risk within the context of
nonextensive statistical mechanics [4,5]. In order to do so we apply methods of statistical
physics, a strategy that has proved to be very useful in several previous works [6] (see also
[7] for general discussions on the application of statistical physics methods in economics).
The nonextensive formalism was introduced over a decade ago by one of us [4] and further
developed [5], with the aim of extending the domain of applicability of statistical mechanics
procedures to systems where Boltzmann-Gibbs (BG) standard formalism presents serious
mathematical difficulties or just fails. Indeed, there is an increasing number of systems for
which the standard mathematical expressions of BG statistics appear to be inappropriate.
Some of these cases can be satisfactorily treated within the new, nonextensive formalism.
Therefore, a considerable amount of applications in many fields have been advanced in the
literature [8]. The wide range of applications probably is deeply related to the ubiquity of
fractal structures, power-laws, self-organized criticality in nature.
The nonextensive statistics is based on the following entropic form
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Sq = k
1−
W∑
i=1
pqi
q − 1
with
W∑
i=1
pi = 1; q ∈ ℜ, (1)
where W is the total number of microscopic configurations i with probability pi. This
expression recovers, in the limit q → 1, the usual Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropic form
S1 = −k
W∑
i=1
pi ln pi . (2)
Within the nonextensive formalism, suitable expectation values of a given quantity A
are calculated as normalized q-expectation values, defined through
〈〈A〉〉q ≡
W∑
i=1
pqiAi
W∑
i=1
pqi
, (3)
where Ai is the value that the observable A adopts in configuration i.
Coming back to economics, traditionally, the analysis of decision making under risk was
treated through the “expected utility theory” (EUT) [9], on the assumption that individuals
make rational choices. More precisely, the expected value E, corresponding to the prospect
P ≡ (x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn) such that the outcome xi (gain if positive; loss if negative) occurs
with probability pi, is given by E(P) =
n∑
i=1
χ(xi) pi, where the weighting function χ(xi)
monotonically increases with xi. (Clearly, a statistically fair game corresponds to χ(xi) =
xi.) There are however aspects of risk sensitivity that are not adequately contemplated
within EUT. Such features were exhibited, through experiments with hypothetical choice
problems, by Kahneman and Tversky [3]. They then proposed a generalization to EUT
equation within “prospect theory” (PT) [3]: E(P) =
n∑
i=1
χ(xi) Π(pi), where the weighting
function Π(pi) monotonically increases with pi.
More recently, PT was generalized [12] using a rank dependent or cumulative represen-
tation where the “decision weight” multiplying the value of each outcome is distinguished
from the probability weight. This interesting generalization is however irrelevant for the
present discussion, where we will deal with simple prospects with a single positive outcome
in which case both versions coincide.
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The typical shape (corresponding to the most frequent human attitude) of the weight
Π(pi) basically is, as sketched by Tversky and collaborators [3,10] on the ground of ex-
periments and observations, an increasing function, concave for low and convex for high
probabilities, with Π(0) = 0, Π(1) = 1 and Π(p∗) = p∗, for some p∗ typically verifying
0 < p∗ < 1/2. The following functional forms have been proposed [4,8] in the context of
nonextensive statistical mechanics: Π(p) = pq, (q ∈ ℜ) and Π(p) = pq/(pq + (1 − p)q),
usually referred to as escort probability. Other functional forms are also available in the
literature [11], such as Π(p) = pq/[pq + (1 − p)q]1/q and Π(p) = pq/[pq + A(1 − p)q], where
A > 0. Clearly, A = 1 recovers the escort probability. In all these cases, each individual
can be characterized by a set of parameters which yields a particular Π(p) representing the
subjective processing that a given individual makes of known probabilities p in a chance
game.
In the regime of moderate and high probabilities, human behavior can be satisfactorily
described by the weighting function Π(p) = pq. This expression, which has a simpler form
than other weights describing the full domain, is the one that we will adopt throughout the
present text.
Let us illustrate, through a simple example, the kind of choice problems we are referring
to. The proponent of a transaction typically asks: “What do you prefer: to receive with
certainty $ 85,000 or to play a game where you receive $100,000 with probability 0.85 and
nothing with probability 0.15?”. The game occurs only once. In this case most people
choose to take the money.
Clearly, the present games are not the kind of operations that actually occur in a financial
market. However in the sense of the theory of financial decisions, they paradigmatically
illustrate the risk aversion phenomenon.
One can think in terms of normalized q-expectation values as follows
〈〈gain/take the money〉〉1 = 85, 000 (4)
and
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〈〈gain/play the game〉〉q =
100, 000× 0.85q + 0× 0.15q
0.85q + 0.15q
(5)
Notice that the standard expectation value of the game is also $ 85,000; this corresponds
to an ideally rational player, i.e., q = 1. Since most people prefer to take the money, this
means that most people have q < 1 for this particular decision game. For the loss problem,
an analogous reasoning leads to q < 1 also, therefore unifying both situations.
Now, how can we measure the value of q that characterizes the attitude of an individual
in connection with a particular game? The person is asked to choose between having the
quantity X in hands or playing the game of receiving Y =$100,000 with probability P = 0.85
and nothing with probability 0.15. Then we keep changing (typically decreasing) the value
of X and asking again until the person changes his(her) mind at a certain value Xc. Then,
the value of q associated with that person, for that problem, is given by the equality
Vc =
100, 000× 0.85q + 0× 0.15q
0.85q + 0.15q
(6)
In particular if the threshold value is 85, 000, this means that the individual acts rationally,
with q = 1.
If unnormalized q-expectation values were considered instead of (3), i.e., if 〈〈A〉〉q ≡
∑W
i=1 p
q
iAi, then it is easy to show that most individuals act with q > 1.
In a recent work [13] we investigated the consequences of risk averse attitudes in the
dynamics of economic operations. We introduced an automaton simulating monetary trans-
actions among operators with different attitudes under risky choices. Elementary operations
were of the standard type used in hypothetical choice problems that exhibit risk aversion [3],
that is, of the type illustrated above. By following the time evolution of the asset position
of the operators, it is possible to conclude on the consequences of each particular attitude.
We concentrated on problems where moderate or high probabilities are involved.
We considered different cases: in A (alter-referential), the proponent operator somehow
knows the psychology of the other (characterized by q′); in S (self-referential), the propo-
nent ignores q′ and attributes to the other operator his/her own value of q; finally, in C
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(consensual), the two operators act by consensus. Different restriction rules on the level of
indebtedness of the operators were also considered in the model.
One observes that the type of conditions limiting indebtedness are critical for defining
the nature of the long term evolution, i.e., existence or not of a nontrivial steady state. If
individuals become permanently forbidden to trade from the instant their assets become less
than a minimal quantity M∗ (restrictions of type PR, standing for permanent restraints)
then the assets evolve to a trivial steady state where there is concentration of wealth around
the more rational player (a Dirac δ-function centered at q = 1 or at the boundary closer to
q = 1). This result is independent of the initial distribution of q.
We also considered opportunistic indebtment restraints (type OR, standing for oppor-
tunistic restraints) where agents can operate indefinitely except that they do not pay when
they would have to do so if at a given step of the dynamics their assets become less the
minimal quantity M∗ (i.e., operators can become swindlers occasionally). In this case the
system evolves to a nontrivial steady state. The details of this steady state depend, among
other factors, on the distribution of the parameter q of the operators. In Fig. 1 (a), we
exhibit the average amount of money of the operators M¯(q, t) as a function of their q for
different time instants (the average is taken over a large number of realizations (histories)
). The initial distribution of q was a uniform distribution in [0, 4] since about 75% of the
people are risk-averse when high probabilities are involved (in the simulations we considered
unnormalized expected values, therefore most individuals act with q > 1). The maximum
of the distribution depends on the hypothesis made on the value of q of the partner. For a
hypothesis of type A, the rational player wins, for type S there are maxima on both sides
of q = 1 (the absolute one being for q > 1, i.e, agents who are conservative for gains). For
the consensus case C, the maximum asset occurs for q > 1 (for more details see Ref. [13])
Interestingly enough, some level of tolerance with regard to those who owe money avoids
extreme wealth inequality to become the stationary state. However, one must keep in mind
that in our simulations the distribution of q is kept fixed along the dynamics and, therefore,
the psychological effect of asset position is not being taken into account in the present model.
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The inclusion of such ingredient in the dynamics would provide an improved, more realistic
model.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Time evolution of assets with indebtedness restraint of kind OR (without exclusion of
those who are indebted) with thresholdM∗ = 100. (a) M¯(q, t)−Mo)/Mo vs. q at term t/N = 25000
when the steady state is already attained. Lines correspond to simulations averaged on 2 × 103
histories with uniform initial assets M(q, 0) = Mo = 1000, number of agents N = 40, quota
interchanged in the game S = 100 and probability for playing the game P = 0.85. (b) M¯(qmax, t)
vs. t and (c) qmax vs. t, where qmax maximizes M¯(q, t). The initial distribution of assets is uniform
in [0,4]. The steady state does not depend on the initial distribution of assets.
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